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Introduction
Shading himself from the fire Teri Sunu keeps peering into the dark
skies, looking for the trim, bleak sickle of the new moon. His
friends around the fire call him back: 'No use looking for the sky,
for the new moon. This years' Ramadan will not start until the
Sokoto Imam has announced it. Come and listen to the 'poste radio'.
Through the cracking and whistling noise a fulfuldé speaJdng voice
is heard, announcing that the moon sickle has been spotted. The
1972 Ramadan has started, in Sokoto, but also in the village of
Mogodé, tucked away in the Mandara hills of North Cameroon some
1000 kilometers from Sokoto, as the raven flies.
Such a scène of a pagan Community listening to their old Muslim
enemy, thé Fulani, can be witnessed throughout West-Africa. They
may have been scourged by thèse Fulani in thé last two centuries,
thé fact remains that these isolated communities have been drawn
mto one of the largest state building movements of Afrika. It was a
holy war, a movement to puriry Islam, that brought this about, thé
jihäd of Usman dan Fodio.
My aim in this paper is to show why such 'pagan' peoples as thé
Kapsiki were involyed in a puritanic movement, why, in fact, they
had to be drawn in through the process of state formation that in
itself was a corollary of thé Islamic puritan movement. I hope to
show that the impetus of the state building process résides in a
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complex set of factors, of which the drive for purification is a very
important one, but that the outcome of the empire formation for a
larger part dépends on non-ideological factors. Eventually, the
impact of these factors tends to reshape thé puritanical movement
into au administration, the practical exigencies of which will destroy
thé original ideals. The quest for purity ends in an impérial organi-
zation.
The pre-jihâd situation
The history of Northern Nigeria up to thé 19th Century is dominated
by the Hausa city states. Though of one tribal origin, thé Hausa
never formed a coherent politica! body. Smalt states like Kebbi,
Zamfara, Gobir and Zazzau tried to gain a lasting ascendancy over
one another, and through this internecine warfare, invariably found
themselves under thé actual or nominal dominion of other powers.
When during thé 14th and 15th centuries thé Hausa states grew
ever more populous and wealthy, they became a potential source of
booty and tribute for thé eastern Bornu empire that was situated
around lake Chad. In thé sixteenth Century Songhai, operating from
Gao, was able to conquer Hausaland, as thé différent Sarkin (chiefs)
of thé states failed to unité against thé common enemy. The tenuous
Songhai hold over the area was interrupted by internai war between
the states, and in the 18th Century by the short apogée of the
Kwararafa Jukun kingdona from the South. From 1734 the area was
under Bornu command again (Johnston 1967:14).
The Hausa states, as well as their conquerors, can be best
characterised as 'predator states', relying on raids and wars to
'harvest their erop of slaves', the spoiïs of war feeding the warrior
aristocraties (Smaldone 1977:12). Captured slaves were needed for
cash erop production and for long distance commerce, in which they
were exchanged for horses and - later - guns. Thus, the means of
destruction - armies - served as a means of state production (Goody
1968). This dependency on slave raiding is a central issue in the
understanding of the results of the jihid, and will be discussed in
greater detail later. On this basis the Hausa had built an elaborate
state apparatus, with a great number of officials and a strict
hierarchical ranking. In the city artesan guilds, often of slave
extraction too, were an important part of the society. In the
periphery of the city the cultivators raised their crops in a serf-like
dependency on the overlords.
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Between the largely settled Hausa cultivators, the Fulani lived
with their cattle. This tribe, one of the great enigma's of West
Africa, is central in the story of nineteenth Century puritan Islam.
From the tenth century onwards (Hatch 1970) they wandered from
their Futa Jalon homeland westwards, gradually drifting into Hausa-
land at least before the sixteenth century (Johnston 1967:24),
arriving in some area's before the Hausa (Webster & Boahen 1967).
Eventually they drifted east of lake Chad, even as far as Khartoum.
Theirs is the story of the nineteenth century Emirates, theirs is the
story of the jihäd; they purified West-African Islam. Together they
number over 6 million, spread out unevenly over the whole of the
Sudan belt of West Africa. Their largest concentrations were and are
in their Futa homelands, in Mali and in Northern Nigeria. In
Hausaland they numbered about 30% of the Hausa population (Hatch
1970, Shaw 1978).
The third party in the politica! set up were the slaves. Hausa
society and to a lesser extent Fulani society fed on captives. Hausa
courts were replète with slaves filling in all possible slots in the
organization, even occupying important positions like minister of the
interior or chief of all slaves (Smith 1978:138, 141). Such slave
officials could own slaves themselves. The slaves outside thé courts
were responsible for most of the staple erop production and made up
a considérable part of foot soldiers in the Hausa army (Smith
1960:134).
The fourth party comprised the pagan groups living in the margin
of the city state or - later - on the fringes of the empire. The
Kapsiki of our introduction are part of this category, as are the
numerous tribes of the central Nigérian plateau. These are the
people who were habitually raided for slaves; though they never
converted to Islam, they do form an important part of the empire,
as they form the slave reserve needed for the functioning of the
economie and political apparatus.
The Fulani at the end of the eighteenth century by no means
presented an undifferentiated unit. Not only were they composed of
several large, politîcally independent clans, many of them did not
live as cattle nomads (Monad 1975, Stenning 1959, 1966). In the
margin of the cattle raising Fulani and their (ex-)slaves who either
raised cattle or cultivated staple crops, the Fulani harboured a large
number of scholars, men versed in the Quran and Islande law, who
preached and taught sunnitic Islam of the MaliM school (Lewis
1966:9). In fact, Fulani society was able to sustain an astonishingly
large number of Muslim scholars, who wandered with the herdsmen,
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and - if family circumstances permitted them - took off for their
pilgrimage (Last 1967:Ixxviii). They had few possessions, being
nomads, but nurtured the books they had as priceless treasures. In
fact, besides being able to récite the entire Quran in Arabic, they
possessed - and knew by heart - whatever book they could get hold
of. They travelled extensively to each other, and took years to be
taught at the house of another scholar. Islamic teachers of great
réputé, were sought after throughout the Sudan, and their pupüs
travelled over thousands of kilometers to them.
This was facilitated by three factors. First, the geographical
setting of the Sudan zone makes travel very easy, either on horseb-
ack or on foot. Secondly, wherever a scholar went in this zone, hè
always found fellow Fulani around, to help and house him, and to
listen to his teachings and preachings, greatly appreciating his
présence. Thirdly, all scholars spoke and wrote in at least three
languages, Fulani, Hausa and Arabic. Thus, the whole range of
Arabic learning was open to them; in fact they almost routinely
travelled to the great Islamic centers of teaching. One example from
that period may illustrate this: The famous traveller Barth reports
meeting in 1852 in Baghirmi (now in Chad), an elderly and comple-
tely blind Fulani called Sambo.
'I could scarcely have expected to find in this out-of-the way place
a man not only versed in all branches of Arabic literature, but who
had even read (nay, possessed a manuscript of) those portions of
Aristotle and Plato which had been translated into .... Arabic, and
who possessed the most intimate knowledge of the countries which
hè had visited.'
This man had studied many years in El Azhar in Egypt, in Zebid in
Yemen, famous for the science of logarithms, from Bagdad to
Andalos (Barth 1857, ffl:373). So the intellectual scène of the era
was remarkably open, pepple travelling extensively, writing books in
the classical Arabic tradition with the füll support of their cattle
herding tribesmen (Last 1967: Ixxvi).
This is mainly a Fulani picture, though Touareg scholars (Norris
1975:146 ff) and some Hausa scholars (Smith 1978:28ff) fit in too.
Despite wars that raged between the Touareg and Fulani at several
tunes, the scholars dld keep their contact. The majority of Hausa
scholars however, Muslim too, were officials in the court of the
Sarkin (kings) of the various states. Their allégeance to Islam (as
was to be stated with great vigour by the reformers) was compro-
mised by this dependency. The Sarkin overlords had multiple
religious loyalties, being at the same time Muslim Sultan and cult
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official for the numerous pagan cults. Thus, in the eyes of the
Fulani mallam (scholar) at least, the Hausa scholars were tainted, an
issue on which we will return later.
The Shehu
Despite the range of learning and travelling, most of the religieus
training was done by kinsmen, uncles or cousins; if possible the
father or an an eider brother. The Fulani, however cosmopolitans as
they were, remained and still are very clan conscious. Thus, thé
Toronkawa clan, one large Fulani clan which is closest to thé
Tucolor of Futa Toro, as a whole bas had a tremendous impact on
West African history. They are thé theologians of this jihad, but
also of other holy wars: they are thé prime movers of at least four
empires (Webster & Boahen 1967, Adeleye 1974, Clarke 1982).
The jihSd that resulted in thé Sokoto empire is dominated by one
Toronkawa family, that of Usman dan Fodio, a towering figure who
is practically a national hero-saint m Nigeria (Shagari & Boyd 1977).
Bora on 15 December 1754 in the realm of Gobir, the most powerful
Hausa state at that time, hè lived most of Ms life as a nomadic
scholar, wandering with his kinsmen and their herds. Dégel, close to
thé Gobir centre, was the area of his early years. In fis youth he
was taught by his father Muhammed Fodio, by an uncle and a
distant relative. The latter's teaching took Usman to Agadesh, a
renowned center of learning in that era. There he met the most
influential Muslim scholar of the late 18th century, el hadj Jibril b.
Umar, not a Fulani but of Berber origin (Last 1967:5). Jibril
preached a revived, vigorous and uncompromising Islam; his message
echoed thé Wahhâbite teachings, that were gaining acceptance in thé
Arab peninsula those very years (see Waardenburg, this volume). He
had become acquainted with those ideas during his first pilgrimage.
When Jibril left for his second journey to Mekka, Usman was called
back by his father, so the young man could not perform a pilgri-
mage. In later years family responsibilities again prohibited Usman
from his hadj; this 'failure' was a lifelong regret to him. In many
poems he expressed his deep désire to visit thé holy places, to walk
in thé traces of thé prpphet and to worship Allah as a pilgrim (Last
1967:212). His multiplying commitments kept him from this journey,
which would have lasted between eight and ten years.
Through these teachers Usman was introduced to thé Quran, to
thé sunnitic tradition and to thé finely tuned jurisprudence and
judicial reasoning of thé Shari'a 'm thé Maliki school. In addition to
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this orthodox schooling, hè was initiated into Sufism, to one of the
many strains of Islamic mysticism i.e. the teachings of al-Qadiri, the
great Baghdad mystic Si Mohammed Abdel Qader al Djilani (Triaud
1969:155; Hiskett 1973:60). Among the many 'mystic ways' this
Qadiriya order was one the dominant ones of in West Africa. lts
spread and influence date from the times of al Maghili in the late
füteenth Century (Hiskett 1973:5); from that time the spread and
consolidation of Islam went hand in hand with the spread of Sufism
(Abun-Nasr 1965:6-7). Qadiriya Sufism, with its strong combination of
scholarship, ascetism and mysticism, was to mold the teaching of the
Fodio family for générations. After the establishment of the
Caliphate (the later phase of the Sokoto empire) the Tijaniya order
would encroach upon Qadiriya holdings (Triaud 1969:167; Abdun-Nasr
1965:138 ff.), by means of the empire el Hadj Umar was to carve out
from Segu, as well as from witiun (Triaud 1969:168). Still, Qadiriya
remained dominant in Sokoto (Martin 1976).
About the same time the Shehu (which is the usual indication of
Usman dan Fodio in the literature, meaning Shaikh in Hausa) was
conferred nis ijaza (licence to preach), a new ruler, Bawa, attained
the Hausa throne of Gobir (Johnston 1967:28). As a strong-willed
Sarkin, hè was hated by the Fulani because of the severity with
which hè ordered the cattle tax (jangali) to be assessed and collect-
ed. Many Fulani, refusing to pay this tax, had their cattle seized
(Hopen 1958:10). The animosity and friction which this caused, was
by no means the first problem between the Gobirawa (Hausa of
Gobir) and the Fulani, but proved to be one of the major factors
shaping Shehu's course (Jqhnston 1957: 29). Like many frictions to
come, this one was immediately translated into a religieus issue, i.e.
the absence of Shari'a legitimacy to levy such a cattle tax (Hiskett
1973: 143-4). Shehu Usman pointed out that this tax was not one of
the seven forms of taxations authorized by Islamic law; it could be
légal if and only if it was a kind of jiziya, a tax levied on non-
MusHms, as the majority of the Fulani were non-Muslims. However,
in that case it should have been a poll-tax and not a cattle tax
(Johnston 1967:31).
The Shehu, who was just twenty when hè started on his preach-
ing and teaching tours throughout the région, quickly became an
established authority on theology and law. Roaming widely from his
little township of Degel, which was only a hundred kilometers from
the Gobir capital Alkalawa, the Shehu made preaching tours in
Zamfara and Kebbi, going as far south as Ulo and north till Daura
(Smith 1968:143; Hiskett 1973:44). In these other Hausa states, the
power of Bawa was much smaller; some of them were vassals of
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Gobir, while the eastern ones paid tribute to Bornu. In these tours
the Shehu preached the fundamentals of sunnitic Islam: the unity of
God, the foundation and pillars of the faith, righteousness and
reward in paradise, sin and punishment. As each Islande theologian
hè gave minute instructions in ritual and judicial matters. The
proper ways of ablutions, prayer and fasting, tithes and alms, oaths
and marriage contracts were stressed (Hiskett 1973:49ff). When the
Shehu's large successes in Kebbi and Zamfara became known in Al-
kalawa, hè was invited to the Gobir court. In this as well as later
audiences the Shehu took the Sarkin to the task of being a true
Muslim prince, to abstain from oppression of fellow-Muslims, and to
shun any comprise in religion. Rejecting large alms the ruler
offered, the Shehu managed to wrangle some liberties and indulgen-
cies from the Gobir court e.g. liberty to preach freely to all people,
Fulani and Hausa, and the alleviation of taxes. The fact that the 75
year old Bawa granted these demands, showed bis eagerness to
incorporate the new upstart preacher into his dominion, in order to
leave a stable state for the next Sultan (Last 1967:7). From this
time any person wearing a turban (the token of a Muslim identity)
would be respected and no one would be kept from praying or
preaching, a major resuit for the Shehu.
In the next six years Bawa's sons Ya'kub reigned and died in
battle, and the might of Gobir waned because of a succession by
weak rulers. In the mean time, the Shehu became the nexus of a
slowly growing Community, numbering several hundreds of people,
who formed the hard core of fervent believers in the later jihad,
and whose influence through contact with visiting mallams and
through teaching tours far exceeded their numerical importance. In a
later stage the Sarkin is reported to have commentée on the Shehu's
waxing power: 'My father has allowed a seedling to wax, and now it
has grown to large to uproot' (Smaldone 1977:34).
The start of the jihâd
Triggered by increasing fricdon between Hausa rulers and Fulani
Muslims, and fired by a strong convicdon and a clear sense of voca-
tion, the Shehu set out to attack religious laxity in the Gobir court.
In one of his most famous books, hè accused the Sarkin court of a
great number of serious transgressions, which no Muslim prince
should indulge in. These were: officiating in idolatrous rites, non-
observance of proper marriage rules, indulgence in heathen divina-
tion practices, enslavement of Muslims, alliance with pagan groups,
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non-observance of modesty, drinking alcoholic beverages, prostitu-
tion, and - of course - iÜegitimate taxes (Johnston 1967:31 ff). The
riders also forced people to serve in the army even though they
were Muslims (Clarke 1982:115). The gist of his accusations, in this
as well as in later cases, was that the Shari'a was not the basis of
official law. A proper Dar-al-Islam should follow the Shari'a. To
establish this was the single most important purpose of the Shehu's
life. He followed three stratégies consecutively: reform his fellow
Fulani, reform the Hausa court and when the first was completed
and the last one failed, to wage the holy war.
So an important 'weapon' in the impending jihad, was the Shehus
pen. The Shehu, his brother Abdulla, his son Mohammed Bello, his
first wife and several of his daughters were accomplished writers
and poets in the classical Arabic tradition. The Shehu througji his
poems recorded his objections to the Hausa rulers, his expériences
and his eventual call to the jihad. Apart from that, hè wrote over
fifty scholarly works, discussing doctrinal and judicial matters with
local scholars, outlining the proper way for everyday life, explaining
the principles of Sufism. The great majority of these works, ranging
in size from five folios to Substantive thick volumes, was aimed at
the Fulani, at raising the Standard of Islam (Last 1967: 9). Most
books are written in Arabic, and most poems in Fulfulde. From his
Hausa writings, little has survived (Hiskett 1973:37).
In accordance with the prophecies of Al-Maghih", people at that
time expected the Mahdi, as several local prophets had indicated the
years 1200-1204 (1786-1790) fpr the Mahdi to arrive. Throughout his
later life, the Shehu was habitually considered as the Mahdi, though
hè took great pains to deny it. He did believe the Mahdi traditions,
which are perfectly in harmony with sunnitic teaching, but he
considered himself one of the forerunners of the Mahdi (Hiskett
1973:122). However, as long as the actual fighting took place the
Shehu did not deny his Mahdi-ship too vigorously, as it provided an
additional motivation for his people. After the décisive victory,
Usman made it clear that neither the advent of the Mahdi nor the
End of time were close at hand (Clarke 1982:120).
While living his austère life in the open countryside of Degel,
trying to exhort his fellow Fulani and reform his ever more hostile
Hausa ruler, the Shehu in about 1794 had some mystic expériences
which helped hun shape his further course in life. He reports having
seen the saints, and being invested with 'the sword of truth' to use
against the enemies of Allah, while his son Mohammed Bello was
speciaUy singled out to fight the jihld (Last 1967: 10). Though the
jihad would not start for another decennium, this message undoubt-
Purity and statecraft. The Fulani jïhad 159
edly assisted in persuading the Shehu's Community that Hausa rule
would not be changea by preaching alone.
After a rapid succession of some Gobir Sultans after the death of
Bawa in 1795, Yunfa, a former pupil of the Shehu (Last 1967:43),
was elected to the throne. Despite their good personal relationship,
Yunfa tried to get rid of the Shehu, first by an assassination
attempt, then by mounting persécution against the Fulani. His policy
wavered with the varyhig pressures at court Though at one time hè
retracted a predecessor's proclamation that forbade preaching Islam,
conversion and the wearing of the turban (Last 1967:12), the
prevailing mood of his court and the exigencies of his war with
Zamfara increasingly turned him against the scholars of the Commu-
nity. He even sold Muslims into slavery, a capital offense in the
eyes of the Shehu (Last 1967:14). After an unfortunate accident
between Fulani and the Gobirawa of Yunfa the Shehu's Community
fled from Degel to the western border of Gobir, in Gundu. Here they
could count on their support from Kebbi and could build their first
stronghold, rallying their forces for the cause of the 'Community'.
In doing this the Shehu followed the classical pattern of Mohammeds
hijra i.e. the move to Medina. As Mohammed's exile starts the
Muslim calendar, the exile of the Shehu was considered as the start
of the jihad, and as such of the Sokoto empire.
The sources indicate that the Shehu was at best a reluctant
mujahedin, who did not seek the holy war (Hiskett 1977:73). On the
other hand hè did not eschew it. When circumstances temporarily
turned against the Community, he proved to be the staunchest
supporter of the chosen way. In this hè may have been bolstered by
the success two Muslim reformers had had a few years earlier in the
Fulani/Torankawa homelands Futa Jalon and Futa Toro (Trimingham
1968:161-162). Anyway, people came flocking to the Shehu in his
bush outpost of Gudu, and the Community soon grew to ominous
proportions, as the Gobir Sultan saw it. After some dalliances Yunfa
declared war on the Community; in response the Community in a
historie meeting choose the Shehu as its formal leader, as Comman-
der of the Faithful, Amir al-Mumiriin, and raised the Standard of the
jffiäd (Johnston 1967:42). The first battle, at Tabkin Kwatto - since
then a pilgrimage center for the Fulani - settled the course of the
jihad Against all odds the Fulani resisted the shock of the Hausa
cavalry, and rooted the much strenger Gobirawa army. In Bello's
own succinct words:
'The Lord broke the army of the godless, so that they feil back, and
in their flight they were scattered.... We followed at their heels and
slew them that they perished All day we pursued them and only at
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dusk we did return to say the evening prayer and to gjve thanks to
God, the Lord of Création.' (Bello, cited in Johnston 1967:46.)
The slightly apologetic note that they omitted some prayers, is
typical for the strict observance of the rites in the Community.
From this victory omwards the course of the jihäd was by no
means easy. A kind of guérilla warfare developed in which the
mujahedeen suffered some sévère setbacks (Smaldone 1977:38) but in
the end they succeeded in defeating Gobur. They took its capital
Alkalawa, and killed Yunfa. From there, they started to build their
own empire. The crucial issue was the overthrow of Hausa Gobir,
called 'the long Campaign', which took frpm 1804 till 1808; during
those years the fate of the jihäd hung in balance at least three
times (Johnston 1967:56).
The reasons for the military success of the Fulani are varied.
First the political situation of Gobir never had been strong m itself,
as it heavïly relied upon slaves and allies for warfare. The Shehu's
gênerais, his son Bello and bis brother Abdullah, managed to
separate Gobir from all its allies before delivering their final blow.
Secondly, though both armies largely depended upon cavalry, the
décisive factor in many early battles have been the range, précision
and cold-bloodedness of the Fulani archers (Smaldone 1977:25-30).
Thirdly, the Fulani gênerais, despite their incidental vacillations and
mistakes, were on the whole much more skillful than their Hausa
colleagues. Finally, success came from die genera! prerequisites of a
successful guérilla war: insurgence throughout a vast political arena
at the same time, reliance on local domestic production for food and
arms, weapons captured from the enemy, and above all a sense of
mission, of extraordinary commitment. It is this commitment, the
deep conviction of carrying on a jihäd in the name of God, that
made success possible in guérilla warfare. Through the simple act of
passing on a jihäd flag the Shehu could sent forth soldier-scholars
to remote areas to spread the rébellion. It is through this commit-
ment that the Fulani gênerais in every possible instance took the
initiative, taking the enemy off guard (Smaldone 1977:34-35). This
kind of self abnegating abandonment to the cause of Allah in fact
was a major factor in later battles. Though they had only a few
dozen horses in their first battle, the Fulani rapidly developed a
large cavahy force, which proved décisive in their flexible military
strategy. Fighting a jihäd was fighting on horseback, shock-fighting.
Such a cavahy charge, as the one depicted below can only be fought
well when death in the battlefield has its own immédiate and
superlative rewards.
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The Cavalry Charge (from Hiskett 1973:85)
Pagan groups, which either as slaves or as allies, fought in thé
Hausa armies, were invariably overwhelmed by this style of fighting.
Their own tactics aim at preserving their own life and at hmiting
losses more than annihilating the enemy (van Beek 1987).
The same conviction cud hold for any miHtary engagement: major
battles against Hausa Sultans were jihâd, but also small skirmishes
against insurgents once thé empire was established. Even slave
raiding among pagans was considered a jihâd. So each and every
campaign was legitimated by thé füll force of doctrine resulting in a
maximum motivation of the soldiers (Smaldone 1977:35).
Building an empire
After the fall of Alkalawa, the jihâd entered its second stage.
Scholar-soldiers carried the banners of the jihad, blessed by the
Shehu, to the far reaches of Hausaland and bevond. In the period
between 1808 and 1812 the theater of war shifted towards the west,
east and south, establishing the Dar-al-Mam in Bauchi, Gurma,
Daura, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Adamawa (see map). Sokoto was built by
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Bello as a capital in 1809, as the twin capital of Gwandu (Johnston
1977:56ff).
Building the Caliphate of Sokoto was building the Dar-al-Islam
and the early Caliphate of Mohammed's successors was the major
inspiration of the leaders. The Shehu, hearing the title of Khalifa,
was not only the undisputed leader of Northern Nigeria, but as Amir
al-Munünin was considered the suprême leader of all Muslims.
Thpugh some Islamic doctrines only allow for one suprême ÏTTiqm
(Gibb 1957: 55) there is ample jurisprudence for tolerating two
Caliphs as long as they are sumciently separated in time and space
(Last 1967:46-47). In the middle of the nineteenth century, West
Africa knew six suprême Imams: Ahmad of Masina, el hadj Omar at
Segu, the Askia of Songhai, the Mai of Bornu, the Shehu of Sokoto
and the Sultan of Ahir at Agadesh. This prolifération of suprême
commanders not only refiects the loose organization of Islamic
institutions in général, but the politica! situations in the nineteenth
century Sahel-Sudan zone too.
Within the empires the same organizational characteristics
prevailed. The Emirates carved out by the local jihäd delegated from
Sokoto were under nominal control from the capital only. The Emirs
fought their own wars without initial help from the central govern-
ment, rallied their own following of faithful Fulani, negotiated for
allies and ransacked the pagan strongholds in search of slaves. Being
scholars of some renown each of them, they formed their own
schools, wrote their own books and established their own Dar-al-
Islam. They invariably and by all means most sincerely ascribed to
the religious supremacy of the Shehu - and his successors - and
thus to the rightful ascendancy of the central Sokoto government.
However, factual rapports between Sokoto and the Emirates were
few. The most important ones were the regulär levies in wealth and
slaves that had to go to Sokoto, and the right of Sokoto to choose
a successor for a deceased Emir. Both rights were jealously guarded
by the central government and were reciprocated with mih'tary
assistance when needed and with religious support at all tunes (Last
1967:103 ff).
When consolidating the Fulani reign, the Shehu sought to
establish once and for all the Shari'a as the basis of practical law,
as in his view this was the one and only means to build a real Dar-
al-Islam. In fact, the jihäd had been fought for this very reason.
The hated cattle-tax was abolished, and replaced by approved Muslim
taxes, of which the zakat was the most unportant. The Shehu kept
his state officials to a minimum: a Vizier, a judge, a chief of poh'ce
and a land-tax official (Last 1967:57). Though some other officials
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were appointée later, the number remained a fraction of the
population of the Hausa courts (Smith 1978:105-106; 1960:42 ff). The
Shehu went to great lengths to have his administration and its
courts uphold the values of soberness and scholarship, and to preach
these values to his followers (Shagari & Boyd 1977:29). Though his
son built the city of Sokoto as the new capital, the Shehu himself
lived outside its walls most of his remaining years, preferring a
modest house m a nearby village. Hère he dwelt with his wives and
smaller children, assisted by his trusted and all-important Vizier.
Regulär conferences were held by the gênerais who came to consult
the Shehu in his village. The Commander of the faithful left wordly
affairs to his son and brother, and spent his last five years teaching
and writing. Eleven books date from this period (Last 1967:57). They
deal with the work of the Community; Mahdism; the charges of
Bornu (see below). On Thursday evenings hè preached against
oppression of the poor, against robbery in the markets and the
condoning of crimes, ^as well as on the more esoteric subjets of
Qadiriya Sufïsm and généalogies (Hiskett 1977:118 ff). He kept
reminding his people Mohammed's adhortations about the great jihad
of the spirit that was to follow their small jihad of the war
(Shagari & Boyd 1977:28 ff). For hun as weil as for his son Bello,
both types of jihad were permanent. Bello's scathing remarks about
the spiritual status of the new Community members are revealing; of
the ten types of jihad participants he describes, only one is a real
member: someone who shuns tribalism, has no fear for wordly
authority, is a scholar as well as a soldier, has no regard for his
own famé or well being, does not value wordly possessions, is not
fascinated by horses, does not love fighting, but is motivated only
by the love of Allah giving up all possessions and relations, even his
life, for the world to come (Last 1967:59). The Shehu and Bello
succeeded in some measure in having these values of soberness,
austerity and scholarship recognized as the major attitude rulers
should have. Throughout the nineteenth Century, Sokoto remained
both a centre for scholarship and pilgrimage as well as the capital
of the largest state in West Africa (Last 1967:113).
Pagans as a resource
No state, however pious, can exist without revenues. The Shari'a-
based zakat was coüected in Sokoto province, but for the outer
provinces this was insufficient. The major state income in addition
to thé zakat were thé revenues from thé political hierarchy: présents
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from newly appointed officials or aspirant civil servants' donations
and levies from the Emirs. Though Emirs were compelled to send
only their tax surpluses to the capital, the size of their contribu-
tions reflected their own status (Last 1967:105). A fixed portion of
any dead Emir's inheritance feil to Sokoto. At least as important
(Smith 1978:304) as all these revenues was the share of the booty
taken by the Emirs on their own jihäd-expeditions. As a devout
leader had to go on expédition with great regularity, booty was sent
annually to Sokoto, usually in the form of captives. Though instead
of slaves the jizya (poll-tax or protection money) could be sent,
slaves made up the greater bulk of the spoils of war (Fage 1969,
Last 1967:102-107).
Two factors contributed to the success of the empire, increasing
the number of slaves. Firstly, the 19th Century is one of the few
centuries in West African history without a large scale drought
(Bryson & Murrey 1977:95 ff). So, the pagan groups (as well as the
rest of the empire population) were numerous, as no hunger decima-
ted them. Secondly, in roughly the same period as the jihld the
African system of slavery was in a process of transformation
(Lovejoy 1983). The abolitionist drive gradually eliminated the trans-
atlantic slave export from the West African coast. Though far
removed from the Sokoto center, this had its réverbérations for the
Caliphate. As Lovejoy convincingly argues, the net resuit for West
Africa was not the démise of slave raiding, nor of slave commerce,
let alone of indigenous slavery. The most important immédiate resuit
was an abondance of slaves for thé internai market, stimulated also
by the fact that the traditional 'markets' for slaves - North Africa
and thé Middle East - were shrinking (Fyle 1974). Thus developed a
full-grown 'slave mode of production' (Lovejoy 1983:269 ff), trans-
forming thé quest for purity into a state which 'fed on slaves'.
Throughout, the various holy wars that swept through sudan Africa
(thé Sokoto case is one ampng several) 'created a new slaving
frontier on the basis of rejuvenated Islam' (Lovejoy 1983:154).
Raiding slaves was a continuons enterprise, with thé Caliphate even
raiding as far south as thé northern limits of the Zaire river,
through Ilorin, a dépendent emirate (Lovejoy 1981b).
Without this continuons supply of slaves it is difficult to see how
thé Caliphate could hâve expanded and Consolidated as it has done.
Slaves were needed for cultivation of thé domestic crops. In order
to feed thé towns, officiais, herdsmen, armies and caravans, planta-
tion villages were set up around thé cities, where slaves produced
thé diverse staple foods (Lovejoy 1978, 1979). They also supplied thé
great majority of thé arts and craftsmen - making weapons - , spun
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and wove to make clothes and made up a considérable part of the
army as foot-soldiers and archers (Hsher 1971a). As indicated above,
even government positions were often filled by slaves. The great
advantage for the riders was that they had few allegiances other
than towards their master who put them into such a comfortable
position, while they could never take his place. As barter value they
were of crucial importance for the army too. Warhorses could not be
bred on the Sokoto-occupied plains in suffiently large numbers. The
large horses used for cavalry came from the Norm and from the
Western Sudan (Johnson 1976), and in both cases had to be bartered
for captives (Page 1969; Flint 1974). So the quest for purity
indirectly stimülated the slave trade throught the Sahara and even
opened the way for the 'northern' slaves to be sold all the way
South, where they were found in Asante (modern Ghana) (Torre
1978:418). The exchange towards the South was especially important
in obtaining guns.
The slaves made up a sizeable portion of the total population.
For the Sokoto area Barth estimated them at 50% of all inhabitants
of the greater Kano-Sokoto région (Barth 1857 1:523). So a steady
supply of captives was absolutely essential for the Caliphate. These
captives could not be obtained in the vicinity of Sokoto, as few
pagan groups lived there. The Caliphate for this purpose followed
two courses. First, treaties with enemies were established in order
to exchange prisoners of war (Lovejoy 1983:155). More important
still, was the continuous raiding of the frontier pagans. The
Emirates of the southern and eastern fringes, where large pockets of
pagan groups resided, were crucial for this.
As an example the Emirate of Adamawa will serve. In the 1850's
it sent 1000 slaves a year to Sokoto as tribute, receiving about 5000
cpatives a year from its dependencies (Lovejoy 1983:157). This
emirate formed the easternmost expansé of the empire: its territory
now is part of North-Eastern Nigeria and North Cameroon. Tensions
between the local Bâta and the numerous Fulani of the area had
been flaring up into fighting even before the start of the Sokoto-
jihäd. In 1806 Modibo Adama, a young Fulani scholar, was received
with great honors at Sokoto, and was presented a jihäd flag by the
Shehu. With this suprême backing, Adama managed to rally his
Fulani tribal kin as well as some local pagan chiefs behind hun, and
waged a long and arduous series of wars against the many pagans
living in the area (Kirk-Greene 1969:129 ff). Some of those resisted
themselves very successfully, relying on the natura! terrain or on
tactical défense. The Mandara mountains, the area where our
opening example was situated, are a good example of the kind of
166 Walter van Beek
refuge the local cultivators sought (van Beek 1978, 1987). So
throughout the large Emirate of Adamawa, large pockets of pagan
cultivators defended themselves against the more sophisticated war
parties of the Fulani mujahedeen (Hogben & Kirk-Greene 1966:267).
In the hillsides and in the inundated zones of the Logone-Chari
confluence, the pagans could effectively keep the Fulani at bay,
while the latter dominated the open plains. Though Adama and hls
successor Lawale regarded the tenacious résistance and continuous
présence of large pagan groups as a sim* on the Emirate (Kirk-
Greene 1969:431-432). After all, converting pagans to Islam is a
pious act; enslaving them may be a means to that end, but that was
not the goal of the Caliphate slave System. From an analytical point
of view, it was essentiel. Those pagan groups supplied the much
needed slaves, and as such the major wealth of the empire, its
market cpmmodity, its productive labour. Without the large fringe of
slave-raiding Emirates, the Sokoto Caliphate would lack its main
revenues: without slaves its domestic production as well as its war
system would crumble.
The pagans themselves hardly appreciated their crucial rôle in
preserving the Caliphate. They fought hard and well, and in spme
cases buüt up an efficient organisation in resisting jihäd (Morrison
1982:146); though even their mountain refuges could not prevent
them from losing people to the jihädists nor from migrating in large
numbers. The résulte described by an English resident in 1920:
'These are the most lawless, ill-governed places I have seen in
Nigeria.... Slave dealing and slave raiding are rampant— Chiefs of
minor importance were given rifles with which they were encouragea
to attack the wretched pagans (who are) hiding like frightened
monkeys on inaccessible hilltops...of course, everyone goes about
fully armed: spears, shields, bows, arrows, clubs etc.' (Kirk-Greene
1958:84)
In some cases the pagans accepted Fulani dominance and paid jiziya
to escape slavery (Jonnston 1967: 84), some chiefs even using thé
Fulani military might to gain dominion over a reluctant chiefdom
(Adler 1984: 356). Many instances refer to the pagans themselves
paying tribute in slaves in order to avoid being raided. Thèse slaves,
then, were the 'product' of their own internai wars (Vaughan 1977,
van Beek 1987).
The Adamawa case was quite typical of the 'outpost' Emirates.
Though it lasted about a Century and its religious authority and
military might never were in doubt, there never was a lasting peace.
Adama and his successors continually were fighting uprisings from
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pagans and incursions firom other Emirates on their territory. The
Mandara Sultanate was the main adversary for Adamawa, as the
Bornu Sultanate was for the whole of the eastern Caliphate. Between
their slave raids and external wars, the Emirs had to cope with
rebellious kinsmen. From 1878-1898 a great grandson of the Shehu
led a group of followers into Mahdism and even established his own
Community on the west banks of the Mandara mountains (Clarke
1982: 121). From the beginning of the Caliphate (and of the Adama-
wa Emirate) uprisings were dealt with very severely. Fighting against
Sokoto was interpreted as fighting against Islam. In the view of the
Shehu and his flagbearers, a clear watershed between Muslim and
non-Muslim ran exactly parallel to the distinction for or against
Sokoto.
The reason for this is apparent when considering the doctrinal
difficulties in waging war against professed Muslims, one of the
pivotai problems to which we shall return later. So when the Sultan
of Rey Bouba (in North Cameroon) failed to pay tribute, Adama was
forced to wage war. The war was not very successful because of
lack of proper timing (Mohammadou 1972:178). After the siege of
Rey Bouba had ended in a stalemate, the Lamido of Ray, on his own
initiative, paid a levy of 1000 hoes, 10 éléphants' teeth and 1000
slaves (Mohammadou 1972:182). This element of unclear ascendancy
in the Emirate and in the empire was typical. In most areas the
Emirs had built their empire in a virtual power vacuüm, establishing
themselves as rulers where no previous overlords had existed. In a
way their jihad stratégies were aimed at exacüy maintaining that
kind of vacuüm, by eliminating all conflicting claims to power, but
without building any administrative organisation. The jihld-leaders
were reluctant Organizers, trymg to establish a religious/military
dominion per se. Of the structure of their empire they only built the
roof and the foundations, leaving out the living quarters.
Ascetism and war: the two-pronged purity
In the view of the Fulani leaders, the politica! unrest had important
theological advantages. The military instability made for a permanent
jihad, keeping the people on their religious toes as warriors and -
just as important - as scholars. Jihad was to be a lifelong enter-
prise, a way of living and a way of dying. As the jihad fought
corruption and greed among rival Muslim leaders, those very sins, if
checked, would cause the break-down of the empire, as it would add
fuel for a legitimate counter jihad. Al-Kanemi's reform in the Bornu
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empire made such a threat very plausible (Webster & Boahen
1967:37). The Shehu was keenty aware of this problem, though for
him it was, before all, a moral issue. He saw and foresaw greed and
wordliness prevail upon the ideals of Islamic justice, preached and
wrote against it as early as 1809, even before the tennination of the
jihad in Gobir. His poems reflect some bitterness as a few critics
accused him of selfîsh motives:
'I swear by God, the authority of the Shari'a alone. Whoever accepts
office to exploit the country for wordly ends, I swear by God, hè
eats carrion I swear by God, it is the knifë of Satan cuts him
down. (Hiskett 1973:107)
Though most sources are written by the jihadists themselves, the
ascetism preached as well as practised by the Shehu and his follow-
ers, is beyond all doubt. His view of the jihäd was that of a moral
reform, fïrst among the Fulani themselves, then among others. His
private üfe was austère and ascetic: strict honesty in all dealings,
no striving for wordly possessions. Cled m the simplest of the long
Fulani garments, hè tried to live in simple quarters the quiet üfe of
scholarship. He condemned music, except a very limited number of
instruments (no drums except for war or marriage, no guitars, no
flûtes etc.), disapproved of dancing, possessions cuits and prostitu-
tion (Last 1967:235). Of course the practice of venerating trees and
rocks on which sacrifices were performed, and divination by sand,
by stars and by spirits were unlawful (Clarke 1982:115). He castiga-
ted bis young warriors who did not wait the proper tune before
taking a captive woman as their concubine, threatening them with
heil fire (Hiskett 1973:106). His Emirs emulated him in this, like
Adama's soon Lawale who punished wearers of short garments, and
censored morals strictly inside Yola town; hè even forbade whistling,
smoking or snuff taking (Kirk-Greene 1958-139). Up to 1894 the all
important Vizier of the Sokoto Sultan surprised his European visitors
with his soberness. They found him 'seated on a mat placed on the
mud floor of the small house hè occupied in Kano, quietly
studying. an Arabic manuscript in a darkened house, without
the kingly garments or the least sign of state' (Last 1967:224). Still,
neither the Shehu, nor any of his Emirs, really succeeded in
stamping out the customs they condemned.
An inspiring example of course can stimulate the quest for purity
among followers. The Shehu undoubtedly was such an inspiration for
those who came in contact with him, but thé majority of the Fulani
hardly ever saw him. Some mechanism of social control - apart from
thé constant inducement of war and adhortations to study thé sacred
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texts was necessary. The Fulani notion of purity did help in this. It
did not imply an inwards turning into the deep recesses of the soul,
searching for the elusive suis. Nor did the Fulani way of life,
deriyed from the independence of cattle nomadism, favour either
public confession or a major rôle of a controlling third party. The
sunnitic orthodoxy, in the Fulani version, was a practical, ritualistic
religion; purity could be seen. A man (or woman) who meticulously
observed the prayers, fasting and other pillars of Islam, was on the
road to purity. Scholarship had to show in teaching, piety in
preaching, soberness in style of living and the soldier's abandonment
to the cause of Islam was to be tested on each battlefield. So purity
shone through in one's actions. Even so, the ideals had to be
divulged.
One important way of divulging ideals was and is through praise
singers (Last 1967:222). As a special category in society, sometimes
with caste-like qualities (Smith 1978:39), the bards were the ones
who sang on public or semipublic occasion. Extolling the virtues of
the rulers (not necessarily those of Islam, as in less orthodox times
they did the same with apostate rulers) and deriding the amoral
conduct of eventual adversaries, in the Sohoto empire the bards
clearly upheld the values with which the Shehu tried to imbue his
people. The poems written by the Shehu, by other leaders or by
some saintly (wali) woman (Last 1967:223) were recited by them.
They sang them at weddings, funerals, commémorations of battles
and at the feast of the sheep and the end of Ramadan. These praise
singers did and do have sensé for political reality. As an institution
they belonged more to the Hausa courts (Smith 1960) than to the
nomadic Fulani tradition. However, after the Fulani take-over, they
shifted their allegiance, honed their Islande standards and sang in
praise of soberness. Their longue could be sharp as well, ridiculing
laxness and wordliness. So, as long as the Shehu and his successors
clung to the ideals of the jihad, they found a powerful backing in
these bards.
Thus, by his writing and by having his sober example divulged,
the Shehu tried to reform his own society. Throughout the jihäd and
long before it, the main thrust of his message was to his own Fulani
tribesmen. In fact the Shehu spent more time trying to overcome
their sins and weaknesses, than m any other endeavour.
The vision of man in the Shehu's movement actually is optimistic.
The ideal man is that of the scholar-cum-soldier; someone yersed in
the Quran, in Shari'a law, and at the same time skillful in battle;
fearless and faithful. Learning meant a great deal: at one desastreus
battle, near Alkalawa, the Fulani suffered a sévère setback in their
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jihäd. To stress the completeness of the disaster, Bello remarked
that 2000 people had died who knew the Quran by heart (Hiskett
1977:90). Some people lived up to this scholar-soldier idéal, but not
everyone. Still, there was a considérable pressure. The Caliphate
officiais had to conform to this model, as respect for thé law and
Islam was the source of authority for the whole Caliphate, as it had
been the prime mover of the jihäd (Last 1967: 232). As long as
officiais upheld thé Shari'a, they were unimpeachable, and thé füll
force of orthodoxy was behind them.
Tribalism was one of thé vices thé Shehu sought to eliminate: as
ail people are alike for Allah, they should be aSke to one another
(provided they are Muslims). Even if he rated family ties and obliga-
tions as supremely important, those commitments should be second-
ary to thé following of thé Shari'a, secondary to thé obédience and
subjugation to Allah. One of Adamawa's later Emirs carried out this
view to some extrême when as an example he executed one of his
nephews who had indulged in robbery, and amputated thé foot of a
grandson for a similar offense (Kirk-Greene 1969: 144). It was one
of thé deep tragédies of thé jihäd that it increasingly turned Fulani
against Hausa, instead of MusHms against apostates. The reasons for
this graduai tribalization of thé jihäd are complex, residing in
diverging subsistence patterns, thé logic and dynamics of pofitical
alliances and thé stratégies for recruiting couverts for thé move-
ment.
The Shehu never saw thé jihäd as completed. It was but thé first
stage of a séries of major upheavals leading towards the coming of
thé Mahdi. The Shehu's own contribution, by no means belittled by
himself, was that of the Renewer of Faith, one of the many, one of
the last. He tried to hâve thé Muslim Community shut off all ties
with unbelievers, thus lending authority to thé création of the
walled ribat fortifications, a vision which clashed with thé political
reality of constant warring and slave raiding. He expected and
prophesied the coming of Gog and Magog, 'small people with big
ears', who would corne a Century after thé hijra. And as people stifi
point out today: There they came, thé English!' Last, 1967:212).
As a theologian and dogmatist thé Shehu has been compared with
a schplastic author such as Thomas Aquinas (Hiskett 1973:117). The
explicite world view and ultimate knowledge that constituted his
framework were given in thé sacred texts and traditions, and like
many Muslim scholars before and after hun, Usman's main task
consisted in reconciling the discrepancies between his society and
thé texts. The major way of doing so was changing the society, the
minor way was solving all kinds of scholastic riddles on how to
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apply the texts to reality. One of the most tenacious problems was
tp détermine the state of sinners and the nature of unbelief: 'Does
sin turn a Muslim into an unbeliever?' It is characteristic for the
theologicai foundation of the whole jihad, that the war hinged upon
this sophisticated question. Following his médiéval example, Al-
Maghili, the Shehu stated, in défiance of his great and respected
teacher el hadj Jibril, that
'as for him who mixes the works of Islam with the works of sin and
innovation, he is not an infidel, according to the consensus of the
orthodox; but only sins against God and His prophet' (Hiskett 1973:
127).
Still, he took his stand against an overly liberal interprétation: some
measure of sinning and some degree of disobedience imply disbelief
and do make Muslims into infidels. Drawing this une proved
exceptionally difficult, especially when the logic of empire clashed
with that of dogmatics. The Shehu's fine set of distinctions was
tested to the limit when Bornu shook off its Muslim laxity and
initiated a vigourous, successful Islande reform under Al-Kanemi
(Webster & Boahen 1967:38 ff). This eliminated almost all arguments
tor the Fulani jihad against Bornu, as Al-Kanemi aptly pointed out
in his letters to the Shehu (Johnston 1967:105-106). To défend the
proceedings and save the impetus of the Fulani jihad, the Shehu
hardened his earlier standpoints on disobedience and moved closer to
Jibril, who condemned all sin as infidelity. Incidentally this moved
the Shehu closer to Wahhäbism too. Thus, the Shehu was forced to
walk the tight rope between dogma and political reality, in order to
uphold his own integrity and preserve the legitimacy of the jihad.
But the leghnation of actual fighting is a tricky problem in sunnitic
orthodoxy in any way (Peters 1977).
Purity and power: the tragic of theocracy
The aim of Usman dan Fodio - and to a large degree his success-
was a purification of religion. Within Islam this was not a doctrinal
thrust, but a practical one: the people in his days were not living a
truly Muslim life, but were corrupted by wealth and paganism. His
reform was aimed at changing their ways of life, if possible by
changing their ways of thinking. This, of course, runs parallel to the
practical side of Islam in général, in which 'doing just things' and
'doing things the right v/af is more important than 'believuig the
right things in the right way*. This insistance on the praxeology of
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religion, especially to its every day Implementation, fits in easily
with Islam, though it might eventually appear to be one of the
important aspects of puritan Systems in général. They measure the
heart against the yardstick of the person's actions.
Where religion is dominant, no secularized life is tolerated. In
fact, any hint at secularization is viewed as a sin, and a large one
at that: shutting off God from the life of the faithful, and denying
the influence or présence of God in the individuals life. This anti-
secularization stance is quite natural for Islam, but so is the jihad-
tradition. In Islam doctrine and tradition the occurence of and the
need for periodic reform is clearly indicated. Twelve Renewers of
the Faith were prophesied, as weÜ as the Mahdi, so the kind of
movement as described here is part and parcel of Islande preaching.
Maybe by force of this traditions and its récurrent Implementation,
Islam as a religion had succeeded in staying close to its original
form. Important in this respect is the model function of the prophet
and his Community. Not only Mohammed's way of life and leadership
is a model to emulate, but so is his politica! history, his exile the
organization of his Community, his manner of fighting the 'idola-
tors', the organization of the erst Caliphate and so on. Usman dan
Fodio was very explicit in his following of Mohammed's example,
pointing out meticulously all parallels between the great example and
the Fulani situation: like Mohammed hè starled a new epoch from
the day of his exile; like Mohammed hè preached his troops before
battle; leading them in prayer as his prophétie example. His aim in
this was never to become a second prophet: that was not his
intention. Mohammed's dealings simply offered the only proven and
legitimate strategy. _
In another Fulani j3üd in the 19th Century, the same patteras
émergea. When Sheikh Amadou, the leader of the Fulani jihäd in the
Masina, Mali, faced an overwhelming enemy, hè told his followers:
'Ce jour est pour nous un nouveau Bedr. Souvenez-vous de la
victoire que notre prophète remporta sur les idolâtres coalisés. N'a-
t-il attaqué l'ennemi avec 313 combattants seulement? Ne remporta-
t-il pus une éclatante victoire? A son exemple, nous attaquerons
avec 313 hommes prêts à combattre'.(Ba & Daget 1962:213)
So Amadou organized his fighters in parties of exactly 313 soldiers,
leaving a small force to défend his camp (as did Mohammed). Thèse
Masina Fulani attacked their enemy (which they estimated - them-
selves - at 100.000) and gained a miraculous and décisive victory.
Thus, jihädist puritans not only strive to regain thé values and
laws of thé pristine organisation, they also try to relive its history.
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In each jihäd the orignal foundation of religion is recreated. Thus,
in the present historiography of Northern Nigeria, the time of
Ahmado Bello, the Shehu's son and successor, is often compared with
that of the first four Caliphs after Mohammed. Bello's era is praised
as the only one ui which the Shari'a was applied to practical law m
füll, as the golden age of Northern Nigeria. Still today at Sokoto,
the years are counted from both the hijra of Mohammed and the
Shehu; a great number of miracles are attributed to the Shehu,
which in time more and more came to resemble those of Mohammed.
So, this kind of puritan movement quite literally is a repristiniza-
tion, reliving the redeeming history of the central human figure in
that religion.
The idea for a pure state, however, bears some deep contradict-
ions, which compromised Mohammed's Caliphate as well as thé
Sokoto pne. Soberness and a simple life not accommodate easily with
an empire, and in thé Sokoto Caliphate a tension grew between thé
means and goals of scholars and those of soldiers. The realization of
jihad purity never was obtained by thé majority of the people. As
long as a fair number of highly placed persons did reaîize it, thé
structure remained intact. So thîs kind of unobtainable idéal créâtes
différences between people and Unis strengthens a pyramidal and
authoritative political structure. The first cleavage was between thé
orthodox mujahedeen and thé impérial officers. The consolidation of
thé Dar-al-Islam called for différent measures than fighting thé
révolution. The guérilla warfare, which was so effective against thé
Hausa states, had to be transformed into regulär, central campaigns,
regulated by a central government. Soldiers could no longer be kept
on booty and heavenly rewards as payments, but had to be fed and
payed. This tension between thé idéal of purity and the praxis of
power was a persistent thème in thé Sokoto history.
Power, in itself, is a problem for a puritan movement. Centraliza-
tion of power is a usual trajectory in thé process of differentiation
and intégration that accompanies state formation (Parsons 1969,
Luhman 1982). The ideology of purity, with its insistence on equality
of men, is in a sensé a current of de-differentiation (Rueschemeyer
1977). The revolutionary movement downplayed inter-personal différ-
ences, stressed equality and replaceability, and diminished institu-
tionalized differentiation; m short, in Durkheim's terms, a puritan
movement tries to replace organic solidarity by thé former mechanic
one. This may be seen on thé macro-level as a means to revitalize a
society (Tiryakian 1985), to reaffirm its human roots (Wallace 1956)
and to reestablish some fundamental goals of governmental Systems.
However, as Luhman indicates (1982), thé outcome inevitably is on
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the other side: differentiation reaffirms itself and something akin to
the former petrified system reappears. This process, on a much
smaller level, can be recognized in Turner's treatment of structure
versus communitas (Turner 1969). In ritual, equality, togethemess
and shared humanness reign suprême, but daily life inevitably
catches up with the sobering realization that some people are more
equal than others.
Thus, the following contradictions may serve as a case study in a
double transformation: fîrst of all that of a politica! situation by
means of an ideologically triggered revolt. Secondly, the transforma-
tion of the ideology itself, in order to accomodate its own succes.
Religions are very flexible in this latter kind of transformation
(Eisenstadt 1973), partly because the gap between what "is" and
what "should be" is unbridgeable. In the politica! reality this tension
between what is right and what is feasible générâtes créative solu-
tions. For the Fulani four areas of contradiction can be distinguish-
ed: life style, finance, war and slave raiding.
Organized campaigning was at odds with the traditional nomadic
Fulani way of life. So the Sokoto Caliphs tended to settle thé
nomads in large camps, and to professionalize cattle-herding - by
slaves - thus enhancing proto-urbanisation among their often quite
unwilling kinsmen. At the same time, however, thé nomadic way of
life, without possessions or attachments, lies at thé roots of die
ideal man. Each Muslim should independently, on his own initiative
and of his own free will, seek God and submit to Him. The relative
absence of organisation, as we noted above, fits 'm well with this
model of man; it also correlates very nicely with a nomadic way of
life (Stenning 1966). One more factor in this transition was the
growing economie interdépendance of nomads, agriculturalists and
townspeople. For this moment greater riches in goods (pots, knives,
swords, clothing etc.) induced a change against the acclaimed
soberness (v. Raay 1975:22).
Sq ia setüing the nomads - in which they did not wholly succeed
- Caliphs organised their armies but uprooted their own value
system. Politically this proved the only way of containing the ever
emerging power of the Fulani clan-leaders, which - if unchecked-
would put in jeopardy the ideals of the jihad. One other measure
was to build ribat, walled fortifications on the border of the empire.
The doctrine of the Dar-al-Islam is at odds with such a self-
containment of Islande expansion (Peters 1977:71 ff). In the impérial
practice however, it proved to be effective not only in keeping out
enemies, but also for keeping in nomads. The jihld aimed at
purifying nomads first, and reasonably succeeded in this. Still, this
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'pure way of life' in many ways turned out to be a large change in
Me style for thé nomads, than thé (later) colonizations by thé
British (Hopen 1958:15). The roaming nomads became the elite of an
empire within a few years; before thé jihad they were not allowed
to own horses or slaves, after thé purification they became settled
landlords with scores of slaves to tiïï and herd for them (Hopen
1958:17).
A similar clash between doctrine and thé logic of empire ocurred
in taxes. The abolition of cattle-tax levied by thé Hausa Sarldn was
one of thé principal goals for thé révolution. The first measure after
defeating Gobir was to abolish this tax. Even if in the province of
Sokoto only thé zakat was levied, in thé outlining Emirates the
Muslim leaders were forced by financial considérations to levy a
similar cattle tax, to be followed by other non-Shari'a taxes (Smith
1978:262). Especially in thé central regioa of the Hausa states, where
thé Fulani overtook an existing politica! System, in thé latter half of
the 19th Century these politica! organizations gradually re-emerged,
dictated by the exigencies of political reality (Smith 1960:154). At
the end of the Century, the Fulani Emirates in their political
practice closely resembled thek Hausa predecessors. In some of the
peripheral Emirates no such intermediär^ structure existed. In
Adamawa, for instance, the Fulani rule retained more of the original
jihäd flavour (Kkk-Greene 1958) than in Sokoto. In those eastern
expansés, the constant war kept the ideal of the scholar-soldier
more alive than in the center (la Croix 1966). Maybe the greatest
threat to this ideal was not the independent nomadic clansman, but
the well-fed, immobüized burocrat. The latter's main concern was
not fighting the jihäd, but succession to a lucrative office. A similar
clash of priorities lies in thé transformation of a scholar-cum-soldier
into thé founder of a dynasty. Of course this pattern is classical
Muslim, but its reenactment in thé 19th Century Sudan is almost a
by-law.
In anthropological theory on thé origin of the state, war plays a
prédominant rôle in state formation (Harris 1975). Most of these
théories adress themselves to pristine states (Carneiro 1970), but in
secondary states war is a major structuring principle as well (Goody
1968). The Fulani empke is a case in point. As soon as war is
waged, an empke is founded. A pre-existing state makes war an
even more efficient means to promote state formation (Vansina
1968). However, war in itself is at odds with thé quest for purity,
however militaristic and expansionist the ideology may seem. Fkstly,
thé idéal pure soldier has to be thé one who shuns violence-per-se.
Secondly, any batue tends to draw the revolutionaries into further
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engagements. These later battles have less and less to do with the
original quest for purity. In the Fulani case this was clear from the
start. The most tenacious problem between state and scholars
however, remained the akward poUtical fact that most of the
fighting took place against Muslims, i.e. against rival Muslim realms
such as Bornu, Mandara or Baghirmi. As is indicated above, this
triggered off some doctrinal raffinations, but the issue remained
doctrinally doubtful. In the Bornu case a rival jihäd among the
Kanuri did claim similar legitimacy for their counter attacks (Cohen
& Brenner 1974:10 ff). In Übe Masina case, the Fulani theocracy was
overrun by a Bambara based jihäd of el hadj Umar from Segu
(Webster & Boahen 1967:37). In both instances, the military and
impérial reasons for fighting are infinitely more evident than the
doctrinal ones. About the only doctrinal accusation el hadj Umar
could level against Sheikh Amadou of Masina, was the latter's
alliances with pagan groups, which hè was forced to in order to
défend himself against Umars predatory expansions (Ba & Daget
1962:260). So doctrine became a reluctant helpmeet in empire
building.
Finaüly, the whole structure of state and the ideal of the
scholar-soldier (see above) are made possible by a fundamental
conflict between doctrine and practice centering around the pagans
and slaves, and - more generally - around inequality in society.
Without slaves there are neither scholars nor armies. The preaching
of the Shehu stressed the equality of all men, but eventually
suppprted a stratified society, in which professed and ackknowledged
Muslims were inferior to other Muslims. The Community of Sheikh
Amadou of Masina, at one time wanted to do away with all distinct-
ions, especially those pertaining to the artisans guilds. Amadou,
himself the most devout and humble of all West African jihäd
leaders, managed to convince his council that the actual removal of
inequality woiüd result in an impractical society which was not what
Allah wanted (Ba & Daget 1962:185 ff). The more fundamental
opposition between Muslims and pagans - and consequently between
free men and slaves - remained a problem (cf. Peacock 1978). Slaves
were needed, as was argued above, but füll domestic and permanent
slavery is difficult to harmonize with the mission to spread the Dar-
al-Islam, and the potential equality of all men before Allah. In order
to fonction properly, the theocracy needed a pool of non-converts,
who would never be converted at all. Expansion is one practical
solution for this, as during impérial expansion new peoples are being
conquered, and thus supply a continuons input of slaves. When the
days of expansion are over, doctrine has to accomodate itself to the
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fact that permanent pagan settlements réside on its borders. In a
large empire such as Sokoto this could be excused by logistical
problems of domination over a gréât distance. In the situation of the
much smaller Masina theocracy however, logistical problems were no
excuse at all. There, Muslim orthodoxy was forced to make a
compact with the pagan groups, such as the Dogon, to have both a
safe border and a slave raiding reserve near at hand (Ba & Daget
1962:234; Fern, Alexander & van Beek 1982:57 ff). This factor of
slaves as a fundamental resource is somewhat neglected in the
literature on state formation (Ajayi & Crowder 1974), while in the
discussion on African slavery (Markovitz 1977, Tuden & Plotnicov
1970) the state as such is given Bttle weight.
Eventually, because of the need for slaves, the organizational
demands of an empire and the inévitable results of success in war,
the theocracy of the Dar-al-Islam was gradually restructured hito
something closely resembling the predator states which it had so
succesfully destroyed. So, in the oven of jihad purity, doctrine built
a clay Utopia, but after the fire had died, the baked model emerged
in the form of an empire. But such is the tragedy of theocracy.
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